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When the Home Team Calls Their Own Balls and
Strikes: The Problem of Brady Violations,
Accountability, and Making the Case for a
Washington State Commission on Prosecutorial
Conduct
Kate Cohn*
“The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the
courts.” Frederick William Lehmann, 13th Solicitor General of the United
States1

I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Brady Problem
In 1984, the daughter of Clyde Ray Spencer, a police officer in
Washington state, allegedly accused him of molesting her.2 After an
investigation, Spencer was charged with molesting his daughter and two
other children.3 Spencer entered an Alford plea4 after learning that his

*

J.D., Seattle University School of Law. The author would like to thank the SJSJ team
for extremely helpful feedback and edits; Andrea D. Lyon, who first inspired the author’s
interest in Brady; Michael Russo, who assisted with the author’s inquiry into possible
solutions; and Frederick F. Cohn, who first inspired the author’s love of the law.
1
This quote is attributed, but not specifically cite sourced, to Frederick William
Lehmann, 13th solicitor general under President Taft. The inscription decks the panels at
the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. and is quoted within the Brady v.
Maryland opinion, there attributed to a paraphrase delivered by Judge Simon E. Sobeloff.
Rafael Alberto Madan, The Sign and Seal of Justice, 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 123, 194–96
(2008); see also infra note 58.
2
See
NAT’L
REGISTRY
OF
EXONERATIONS
(2020),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3657
[https://perma.cc/YVA9-3UHY] [hereinafter SPENCER MISCONDUCT].
3
Id.
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defense counsel had not prepared to defend his case.5 After serving ten
years of his sentence in prison, Spencer hired a new attorney who
determined that Brady violations had occurred during the lead up to his
initial trial.6 Spencer was later informed that during the first trial, the State
withheld the results of medical exams that demonstrated no physical abuse
had occurred.7 The prosecutor also withheld the fact that Spencer’s wife
was having an affair with the police detective who was supervising the
investigation.8 During the course of discovery, none of these facts were
disclosed to the defense.9 Furthermore, two of the three children eventually
recanted their testimony, claiming they had been coerced into making
statements against Spencer.10 In 2009, Spencer’s plea was vacated, based on
the Brady violations and recantations by his children.11 One year later, he
withdrew his plea and prosecutors dropped the charges against him.12 The
details illuminated in the aftermath of Spencer’s trial demonstrated
suppression of evidence13 that would have been favorable to Spencer14 and
that would have been material to his case.15 This is often what a Brady
violation looks like.
With no systematic, successful accountability mechanisms in place,
many prosecutors are deeply entrenched in the practice of withholding
4

Id.; see also Bryan H. Ward, A Plea Best Not Taken: Why Criminal Defendants
Should Avoid the Alford Plea, 68 MO. L. REV. 913 (2003). An Alford plea allows a
defendant to plead guilty while contemporaneously asserting their own innocence.
5
SPENCER MISCONDUCT, supra note 2.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Thomas P. Sullivan & Maurice Possley, The Chronic Failure to Discipline
Prosecutors for Misconduct: Proposals for Reform, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
881, 895 (2015).
14
SPENCER MISCONDUCT, supra note 2.
15
Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13.
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exculpatory evidence from criminal defendants during the course of
criminal proceedings.16 This practice, known as a Brady violation, can
occur

whether
17

unknowingly.

a

prosecutor

withholds

evidence

knowingly

or

Prosecutors who commit Brady violations reinforce a

culture that places more emphasis on convicting any person than convicting
the right person.18 This behavior, and the culture that propagates it, creates
myriad negative impacts, including wrongful convictions, traumatization
for victims and victims’ families, and high costs for taxpayers.19
Most prosecutors who commit Brady violations are shielded from
accountability due to the absolute immunity afforded to them20 and the gaps
in accountability left by current corrective structures.21 To decrease Brady
violations and their resulting wrongful convictions, Washington state
should influence prosecutorial conduct by teaching students and new
prosecutors methods for meeting Brady obligations and by passing
legislation to enact a Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct.
When law students are afforded experiential and clinical experiences,
they are better able to develop professional judgment that prepares them for
their

legal

careers.22

When

prosecutors

experience

an

“ethical

16

Id. at 914.
Although guidance for a Brady violation resulted from the Brady case, several
subsequent cases have finessed how the rule in Brady is applied. See Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995); see infra
Section II.
18
Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The Role of Law Schools in Addressing Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391, 412 (2011). The author discusses case load
pressure as a motivation for prosecutorial strategy: “It is also true that many prosecutors
carry staggering caseloads, creating pressure to dispose of cases in an assembly line
fashion that can result in oversights or omissions that later lead to allegations of
misconduct.”
19
Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute
Prosecutorial Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 515–16 (2011).
20
Id. at 526.
21
Id. at 511; see also infra Sections II, III, IV.
22
Bazelon, supra note 18, at 407.
17
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atmosphere”23 in their workplace, it is more likely they will choose to act
ethically.24 If the proposed legislation and resulting Commission are
enacted, the shield of immunity and the culture that has normalized Brady
violations will be disrupted. These efforts will foster positive outcomes
related to judicial efficiency, ethical conduct for attorneys, a reduction in
wrongful convictions, and a reduction in trauma for crime victims and
family members of individuals that are wrongfully convicted.25
B. Roadmap
Section II of this article provides a brief history of prosecutorial
immunity, which sets the backdrop for exploring why and how Brady
violations proliferate. Section III introduces Brady violations and the
evolution of case law, explores what the Brady rule was likely intended to
accomplish, and highlights where it has fallen short of protecting criminal
defendants’ constitutional rights. Section IV discusses prosecutorial
accountability mechanisms and offers a critique for why current structures
neither adequately curb Brady violations nor adequately hold prosecutors
accountable. Section V proposes solutions, including training opportunities
at the law school and municipal levels and a Washington State Commission
on Prosecutorial Conduct. Section VI addresses possible criticisms and
responds to those criticisms.

II. ROOTS OF PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY
Prosecutors are granted absolute immunity from civil damages in
lawsuits based upon their conduct when the conduct was undertaken in
pursuance of their prosecutorial functions.26 While this immunity is rooted
in common law, it was solidified by the Supreme Court in Imbler v.

23
24
25
26

Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 926.
Id.
Infra note 181.
Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 923.
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Pachtman in 1976: “The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based
upon the same considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of
judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of their duties.”27
The roots of the protection offered to prosecutors date back more than
one hundred years.28 In 1871, the post-Civil War Congress enacted United
States Code 42 U.S.C. § 1983, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.29 The
Act was passed with the intent to prevent unjust prosecutions of federal
officials who were assisting newly freed slaves with civil rights claims.30
These officials were often victim to malicious prosecution in states that
opposed Reconstruction efforts.31 At its inception, drafters of § 1983
intended to use the federal statute to hold prosecutors civilly liable for
malicious prosecution. In essence, Congress enacted § 1983 during
Reconstruction to help enforce compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment
and protect officials from frivolous tort actions at the hands of AntiReconstruction prosecutors.32
27

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422–23 (1976).
Johns, supra note 19, at 524.
29
At time of original statute, it read, in part:
An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes.
Be it enacted… That any person who, under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to
be subjected any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
of the United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom
or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party
injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit
courts of the United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal,
review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts,
under the provisions of the [Civil Rights Act of 1866], and the other remedial
laws of the United States which are in their nature applicable in such cases.
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
30
Johns, supra note 19, at 510.
31
Id. at 526.
32
David Keenan, Deborah Jane Cooper, David Lebowitz & Tamar Lerer, Myth of
Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional
28
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While § 1983 protected various categories of federal officials,
prosecutors were not specifically protected as a class until twenty-five years
after the statute was first adopted.33 In 1896, the Supreme Court of Indiana
held in Griffith v. Slinkard that, despite known malice committed by the
prosecution, the action should be dismissed based on absolute prosecutorial
immunity.34 Griffith v. Slinkard granted total exemption to the prosecutor,
disregarding the alleged motivation behind the conduct.35 In Griffith, the
prosecutor maliciously indicted a defendant even though the grand jury had
found no evidence or probable cause.36 The court found the prosecutor’s
actions to be undertaken as a judicial officer, although not as a judge of a
court.37 Further, the Griffith court quoted a prominent treatise from the
time:
Whenever duties of a judicial nature are imposed upon a public
officer, the due execution of which depends upon his own
judgment, he is exempt from all responsibility by action for the
motives which influence him and the manner in which said duties
are performed. If corrupt, he may be impeached or indicted; but he
cannot be prosecuted by an individual to obtain redress for the
wrong which may have been done. No public officer is responsible
in a civil suit for a judicial determination, however erroneous it
may be, and however malicious the motive which produced it.38
Over time, Griffith grew to become the majority rule on the issue,39 and
nearly a century after Griffith, the Court solidified immunity for prosecutors

Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE
L.J. F. 203, 214 (2012).
33
Johns, supra note 19, at 526.
34
Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001, 1002 (1896).
35
Id.; see also Johns, supra note 19, at 526.
36
Griffith, 44 N.E. at 1001.
37
Id.
38
Id. (quoting JOHN TOWNSHEND, A TREATISE ON THE WRONGS CALLED SLANDER &
LIBEL (3d Ed.), § 227, pp. 395–396.)
39
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422 (1976).
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in Imbler.40 Paul Imbler spent years in the California courts appealing a
death sentence for a murder he did not commit.41 After ten years of
litigation, Imbler was a free man, which set the stage for his civil suit
against the prosecutor in his case, among other governmental officials.42
Even though Imbler’s conviction was vacated on the basis of egregious
state misconduct,43 his resulting civil suit did not provide him with relief.44
Instead, the United States Supreme Court summarized their position on
absolute immunity by quoting Judge Learned Hand:
As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance
between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it
has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs
done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their
duty to the constant dread of retaliation.45
The Supreme Court’s analysis was based on the premise that common law
immunity was “well settled.”46 The Court went on to ask the question of
“whether the same considerations of public policy that underlie the
common-law rule likewise countenance absolute immunity under § 1983.”47
They held that it did.48 The progression demonstrates how a common law
misnomer was invoked and clung to by the judiciary as a whole in order to
make absolute immunity for prosecutors a majority rule.49
The trajectory of the federal statute demonstrates that its original intent
was flipped on its head as § 1983 was first adopted in 1871 to protect
officials who were helping to ensure that individual civil rights were

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id.
Id. at 415.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 428 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
Id.
Id. at 424.
Id.
Johns, supra note 19, at 526–7.
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protected during Reconstruction.50 However, a handful of state courts began
to interpret this statute as a method to provide absolute immunity to
prosecutors,51 and this slow divergence in the use of the statute leads us to
present day. A statute first enacted to protect individuals’ civil rights is now
being used to provide prosecutors with absolute immunity from civil
liability.52 Scholar and immunity expert Margaret Johns summarized the
disingenuous way in which § 1983 evolved:
[A]nd it certainly did not intend to insulate prosecutors from
liability for malicious prosecutions, since that was one of the
tactics of southern defiance to Reconstruction that the Ku Klux
Klan Act was intended to remedy. To the extent that the doctrine
of absolute prosecutorial immunity purportedly rests on historical
understandings, it is insupportable.53

III. BRADY AND ITS IMPACTS
A. The Evolution of Brady
Under the shield of absolute immunity, prosecutors are largely free to
engage in acts of misconduct, including Brady violations.54 A Brady
violation occurs when a prosecutor or anyone working in support of the
State’s case withholds exculpatory evidence from the defense.55 The United
States Supreme Court summarized this due process violation in 1963.56 The
Court held in Brady v. Maryland that “suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the

50

Id. at 510.
Id. at 526.
52
Id. at 526–7.
53
Id.
54
See Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 204.
55
Jason Kreag, Disclosing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 72 VAND. L. REV. 297, 305–06
(2019).
56
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
51

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

When the Home Team Calls Their Own Balls and Strikes

good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”57 Further, the Court in Brady
contextualized the need for justice:
A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused
which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce
the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant.
That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding
that does not comport with standards of justice . . .58
The key elements of the resulting rule are suppression, favorability, and
materiality.59 A Brady violation occurs if the prosecution suppresses
evidence that is deemed favorable to the defense, and that evidence is
relevant and significant to the facts of the case.60 While most practitioners
in, and scholars of, the legal profession are well versed in the term “Brady
violation,” the scope of obligations laid out in Brady has been distinctly
nuanced by at least three additional United States Supreme Court cases:
United States v. Agurs, United States v. Bagley, and Kyles v. Whitley.61
Each of these cases articulates how Brady places decision-making about the
rules in the hands of prosecutors—the very cadre of attorneys for whom the
rules were created.62
In 1976, the Court in United States v. Agurs held that a Brady violation is
implicated when undisclosed evidence demonstrates perjured testimony that

57

Id.
Id. at 87–88. Within this eloquent part of the opinion, the Brady court quoted
Frederick William Lehmann, who was appointed solicitor general by President Taft in
1910. See also Jeremy L. Carlson, The Professional Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose
Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense: Implications of Rule 3.8(D) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 28 J. LEGAL PRO. 125, 126 (2004); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF
SOLIC.
GEN.,
SOLIC.
GEN.
FREDERICK
WILLIAM
LEHMANN
(2019)
https://www.justice.gov/osg/bio/frederick-w-lehmann [https://perma.cc/KHC2-6VH9].
59
Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 914.
60
Id.
61
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); see also Keenan et al., supra note 32, at
207.
62
Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 914.
58
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the prosecutor knew about, or should have known about.63 In 1985, the
Court in United States v. Bagley held that “evidence at issue is material
only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”64 In 1995, the Court in Kyles v. Whitley held the following:
[The] individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable
evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in
the case, including the police. But whether the prosecutor succeeds
or fails in meeting this obligation… the prosecution’s
responsibility for failing to disclose known, favorable evidence
rising to a material level of importance is inescapable.65
From 1963 to 1995, an evolution occurred from Brady, where the Court
required that a defendant make a request for evidence, to Kyles, where the
Court placed responsibility on the prosecution to disclose known, favorable
evidence.66 In Agurs and Bagley, the Court set standards for perjured
evidence and materiality.67 While these subsequent cases helped clarify
prosecutors’ Brady obligations, many prosecutors still knowingly and
unknowingly conduct themselves in ways that violate Brady.68
Scholars and defense attorneys critique the elements of Brady for leaving
too much decision-making power in the hands of prosecutors.69 For
example, the materiality element articulated by Bagley places decisionmaking about possible case outcomes in the hands of the prosecutor.70 On
its surface, this evaluation sounds similar to the harmless error doctrine:

63

427 U.S. at 103; see also Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 208.
473 U.S. at 668; see also Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 886.
65
514 U.S. at 437–38.
66
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437–38.
67
See 427 U.S. at 104; 473 U.S. at 680.
68
See Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 209–11.
69
Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 914.
70
SAMUEL R. GROSS, MAURICE J. POSSLEY, KAITLIN JACKSON ROLL & KLARA HUBER
STEPHENS, GOVERNMENT MISCONDUCT AND CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: THE ROLE
OF PROSECUTORS, POLICE AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT 76 (2020),
64
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[a] judgment that sometimes a constitutional violation does not
require reversal of a conviction because the outcome of the case
would have been the same without the violation. But it’s not. If the
evidence is “immaterial” there is no obligation to disclose it;
failure to do so is not a forgivable violation of the constitution rule
but, no violation at all.71
The inquiry into harmless error requires a judge to determine whether there
was an error, and whether the error was harmless .72 Within a Brady inquiry,
however, instead of a judge making that determination, the prosecutor
makes the determination during the course of pre-trial and trial
proceedings.73
Similarly, the issue of favorability requires that prosecutors make value
judgements on whether a particular piece of evidence would be considered
valuable to the defense.74 Maurice Possley, a journalist with prosecutorial
expertise, and Thomas Sullivan, who has practiced law for more than sixty
years, made a particularly keen analogy that illustrates the problematic
discretion afforded to prosecutors:75 “Imagine a professional sporting event
in which one of the contestants is permitted to make the close calls—
whether it was a ball or strike, whether the tennis ball was in or out,
whether the tackle was offside, etc.—without oversight by an independent
umpire.”76 The prosecutors charged with making tough calls on the use of
evidence are often torn between two divergent goals: a passionate
representation of the United States government and its people and a strong
desire to actualize a criminal conviction only when appropriate.77
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Government_Misconduct_an
d_Convicting_the_Innocent.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q333-3GWY]
[hereinafter
GOVERNMENT MISCONDUCT].
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 914.
75
Id. at 914–15.
76
Id. at 915 n.131.
77
Id.
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Nonetheless, they call their own balls and strikes, often times prioritizing a
win over engaging fairly with the system.
A prosecutor cannot know every investigative puzzle piece that a defense
attorney may have cultivated,78 leaving them guessing as to whether
something should be considered favorable or not. Defense attorneys are
much better poised to determine what evidence will best support their
client.79 Practicing attorneys also critique the element of materiality for
being subjective, at least at the stage that informs prosecutors’ decisions
related to disclosure of evidence.80 Although materiality is considered an
“after the fact” test”81 because it is evaluated at the appellate stage, defense
attorneys and scholars argue that prosecutors who feel they have a strong
case will ignore disclosure, feeling confident that non-disclosed evidence
would not impact the outcome of the case anyway.82 These considerations
can lead prosecutors to feel that their Brady obligations can be ignored. As
one Brady scholar, Alafair Burke, stated:
Much of the blame for Brady’s failure to protect the innocent has
been laid at the doors of the prosecutors charged with the
doctrine’s effectuation . . . Brady has become a “paper tiger,”
frequently and blatantly disregarded by prosecutors who have
come to realize that they can suppress exculpatory evidence with
few repercussions other than higher rates of conviction.83

78

Id.
Id.
80
Id. at 917.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 916.
83
Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 482 (2009).
Although a full critique of Brady elements is outside the scope of this article, it is
contextually important to share Burke’s harsh critique of the materiality element:
Although the word “material” might at first blush seem so immaterial in the
original Brady opinion, surrounded as it was by such sweeping and ambitious
rhetoric, that single word has since proven a significant restriction on a
prosecutor’s constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. Brady’s
progeny have made clear that prosecutors are not constitutionally obligated to
disclose all exculpatory evidence, or even all relevant exculpatory evidence. In
79
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In Brady, the Supreme Court dictated that when prosecutors withhold
exculpatory evidence, justice is not served.84 The Court further tailored the
rules in subsequent cases,85 but prosecutors still have broad discretion86 and
are often challenged to act within the confines of competing values:
pursuing a conviction and appropriate outcomes for a criminal defendant
for whom they hold deep beliefs regarding guilt while evaluating ethical
considerations and less tangible notions regarding “fair play.”87
B. Brady’s Impacts
Prosecutors’ disregard for Brady results in myriad negative impacts that
are felt by wrongfully convicted individuals, crime victims, their families,
and taxpayers.88 Wrongful convictions ruin the lives of the innocent
individuals, many of whom will never regain their freedom.89 Rather, they
are taken from their families and experience detrimental effects on their
physical and mental health.90 Additionally, wrongful convictions allow
individuals who actually commit crimes to remain free, causing safety risks
to communities and society as a whole.91 When the wrong individual sits in
prison, the actual perpetrator of a crime is free to commit additional

fact, the definition of “material” exculpatory evidence is so restrictive that it is
probably best articulated not as a duty of the prosecutor to disclose, but as a
narrow exception to a prosecutor’s general right to withhold evidence from the
defense. Under Brady’s progeny, a prosecutor can constitutionally withhold all
evidence, except for exculpatory evidence that “creates a reasonable doubt that
did not otherwise exist.”
84
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
85
See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); see also Keenan et al., supra note 32, at
207.
86
Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 914.
87
Bazelon, supra note 18, at 411.
88
See Johns, supra note 19, at 514–15.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 515.
91
Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 884 n.5.
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crimes.92 This injustice creates substantial negative impacts for victims and
victims’ families, in particular those who begin to understand that the
person who sits in prison is not the person who harmed them or their loved
one.93
There are also high taxpayer costs incurred when a person is wrongfully
convicted.94 The courts must administer a trial (and often multiple resulting
appellate proceedings) for an innocent person.95 Offices of prosecution and
public defense incur costs during these proceedings.96 Wrongful convictions
incur incarceration costs.97 Federally, the cost for incarcerating one inmate
in fiscal year 2018 was between approximately $34,000 and $38,000,
depending on the facility.98 In Washington state, the cost for incarceration
in fiscal year 2018, per inmate, ranged from $32,000 to $40,000, depending
on the facility.99 Current taxpayers are paying court and prison costs for
individuals who do not belong there.100 Because statistics about wrongful
convictions are generally lacking,101 it is difficult to create a savings
formula based on these annual averages. The lack of data also limits how
states can respond to Brady violations.102
It is difficult to find specific data on Brady violations nationally or at the
statewide level.103 There is no state registry or data collection currently
92

Johns, supra note 19, at 516.
Id. at 515.
94
Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 884.
95
Id.
96
Johns, supra note 19, at 516.
97
Id.
98
NAT’L ARCHIVES, FED. REG., ANN. DETERMINATION OF AVERAGE COST OF
INCARCERATION
FEE
(COIF)
(2019),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/11/19/2019-24942/annualdetermination-of-average-cost-of-incarceration-fee-coif
[https://perma.cc/RS3J-V883]
[hereinafter INCARCERATION FEE].
99
Id.
100
Johns, supra note 19, at 515–16.
101
Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 239.
102
Id.
103
Id.
93
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available.104 Prosecutors are not named in appellate opinions that involve
Brady violations105 and because there is very little accountability by way of
professional standards mechanisms, the organizations that manage those
professional standards are not a good data source for tracking known
violations.106
However, the National Registry of Exonerations provides data on
exonerations that can be filtered by multiple factors, including by state.107
Official misconduct, which can and does include Brady violations, is one of
the elements relayed in the data. For example, since 1989, the National
Registry of Exonerations has documented fifty-two exonerations in
Washington state.108 The Registry provides that twenty of those
exonerations (nearly 40%) involved official misconduct.109 At the time of
writing, the data does not specifically call out Brady violations, but these
violations would be classified as official misconduct.110 Further research is
needed in order to claim, with confidence, a percentage of Washington
state’s exonerations that are due in part or in whole to a Brady violation.111
The lack of empirical data is a real barrier in effectuating productive Brady
accountability, because like any social problem, identification of the issue is
a first-step to solving the problem.

104

Id.
Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1062 (2008).
106
Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 213; see also Johns, supra note 19, at 520.
107
See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, INTERACTIVE DATA DISPLAY (2019),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerations-in-the-United-StatesMap.aspx [https://perma.cc/HLC4-8F25] [hereinafter EXONERATION DATA].
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
105
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IV. BRADY ACCOUNTABILITY (OR LACK THEREOF)
The issue of accountability for prosecutorial misconduct in the legal
profession is multifaceted. This section will explore five specific flaws
within our criminal justice system: (1) the weakness of appellate processes
as accountability mechanisms; 112 (2) the near limitless civil protections that
§ 1983 provides to prosecutors;113 (3) the inexistence of criminal
prosecutions against prosecutors who violate Brady;

114

(4) the lack of

enforcement of professional conduct within both state and federal
government;

115

and (5) the lack of both state and federal legislation to

enforce Brady accountability.116
In appellate processes, courts will only overturn and/or vacate on a Brady
violation if the appellant can meet a very high bar, showing all three
elements of the rule: suppression, favorability, and materiality.117 While
suppression and favorability are often easier to prove, the materiality
requirement demands there be a reasonable probability that the evidence
would have changed the outcome of the case.118 Further, the bar for proving
that a prosecutor acted under excessive liability is so high that it
disincentivizes plaintiffs from filing for an appeal.119
Judges evaluate Brady violations using the harmless error doctrine. When
a judge finds that a violation occurred, the violation will only lead to an
overturned conviction if the appellant can prove that they suffered
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identifiable prejudice, based on the Brady violation.120 Even when judges
do discuss Brady violations within appellate opinions, they often times go
out of their way to avoid identifying prosecutors that are implicated in those
violations.121 Some appellate judges may believe that when they reverse a
case based on misconduct, they are finding fault of a prosecutor for the first
time.122 It is possible that an appellate judge believes they are acting out of
compassion, believing that the reversal itself will admonish the prosecutor’s
bad behavior.123
Yet this very practice offers intentional or unintentional shield to those
with serial misbehavior.124 For example, the Florida Supreme Court and
California Supreme Court both heard cases in the late 1990s with findings
of serious prosecutorial misconduct. In both sets of circumstances, lower
courts had already admonished bad behavior when authoring appellate
decisions, but always with the overt decision to use “Assistant United States
Attorney” (or AUSA) in their written decisions instead of personally
naming the prosecutorial offender.125 In California, the prosecutor engaged
in misconduct during a death penalty case many years after she was first
admonished (but never by name within appellate decisions).126 The
California Supreme Court only became aware of the two prior admonishing
decisions because of research conducted and submitted by the appellant’s
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attorneys.127 In both the California and the Florida examples, the
prosecutors resigned, which prevented future misconduct from occurring.128
While these examples are by no means standalone,129 it is more rare than
not for prosecutors to be named in appellate decisions.130 Thus, even when
an appellant overcomes Brady, it is not likely that the prosecutor who
committed the violation is held accountable by way of the appellate
process.131
Accountability by way of civil suit also proves a difficult endeavor, in
part by creating confusion and relying on common law misnomers.132
Although § 1983 itself did not promise immunity when first enacted in
1871, states and the courts have worked progressively over time to interpret
it as such.133 As highlighted in Section II, the concept of personal tort
liability under § 1983 has been rejected by the United States Supreme
Court.134 Municipal tort liability (civil liability imposed upon the
municipality) was sometimes used with success for plaintiffs135 until 2011,
when the United States Supreme Court held in Connick v. Thompson that
“plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments under § 1983
must prove that ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused their
injury.”136 Justice Ruther Bader Ginsberg dissented in the case:
[a] district attorney’s deliberate indifference might be shown in
several ways… [District Attorney] Connick created a tinderbox in
Orleans Parish in which Brady violations were nigh inevitable.
And when they did occur, Connick insisted there was no need to
change anything, and opposed efforts to hold prosecutors
127
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accountable on the ground that doing so would make his job more
difficult.137
As discussed in Section II, personal tort liability has long been a dead end
for achieving justice and accountability, and with Connick, municipal tort
liability has joined that path, leaving one fewer mechanism for
accountability.138
The United States Supreme Court offered criminal proceedings against a
prosecutor as a possible remedy in 1976 when it reinforced absolute
immunity in Imbler,139 but it failed to cite even one occurrence where
criminal proceedings had been successfully pursued.140 Prosecutors are
rarely, if ever, held accountable by way of criminal proceedings.141 In
Section III, the relaxed enforcement of prosecutorial discretion was
analogized to a sporting event, where one team’s own members would be
expected or required to take action that is in direct opposition to their ability
to win the game.142 Similarly, if criminal proceedings were to be initiated
for prosecutors, other attorneys—often times their own colleagues—would
be required to take the first step by filing charges.143 Although the
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires
that an attorney report behavior of another attorney,144 one study of 1,000
Boston attorneys found that less than 7% of those surveyed would report on
a colleague who had engaged in flagrant behavior.145 If attorneys will not
come forward to ethics boards, it is unrealistic to believe that they would
actually file charges against their colleagues in a court of law.
137
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Prosecutions of prosecutors for misconduct are nearly nonexistent.146 At
the federal level, prosecutors can be criminally prosecuted for violating
constitutional protections under 18 U.S.C. § 242.147 However, this avenue
proves more theoretical than practical, and it is rarely used.148 At the state
level, it is difficult to know how many prosecutors have faced criminal
liability for misconduct.149 A comprehensive report put out by the National
Registry of Exonerations cites only two known prosecutions.150 In both of
these cases, the prosecutors who became the defendants received nominal
sentences.151 First, in 2007, Michael Nifong, the former District Attorney of
Durham County, North Carolina, was convicted of criminal contempt for
concealing exculpatory evidence in a prosecution of three members of the
Duke University Lacrosse team who were falsely accused of rape.152 Nifong
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GOVERNMENT MISCONDUCT, supra note 70, at 102.
Johns, supra note 19, at 520. The code, titled Deprivation of Rights Under Color of
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spent one day in jail.153 The attention this case received resulted in an
additional exoneration for someone previously tried by Nifong in 1991.154
Next, in 2013, former Williamson County, Texas District Attorney, Ken
Anderson, was convicted of contempt after concealing exculpatory
evidence that would have prevented a wrongful conviction for a man who
spent twenty-four years in prison before his exoneration.155 Although
prosecutors Nifong and Anderson spent only five days in jail between them,
they were both eventually disbarred and lost their jobs.156 To date, the
National Registry of Exonerations names these two as “the only two
American prosecutors who have ever been convicted of criminal contempt
for lying in court.”157
The number of criminal prosecutions for prosecutors is likely so low due
to a societal perception that criminal liability is too harsh for someone who
made a technical error in the course of their demanding and stressful
work.158 The legal community may prefer alternate avenues of
accountability, reserving criminal proceedings for those practice errors
considered most egregious.159 Within this current environment, the
prosecutor may make a technical error and cause an innocent person to lose
their freedom, but never be judged under the same criminal justice system.
If this is the accepted norm, it should give us pause. With civil liability and
criminal proceedings largely unavailable, few avenues remain to provide
justice and accountability for those whose constitutional rights have been
infringed upon as the result of a Brady violation.
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As mentioned above, professional responsibility measures are highly
underutilized and largely ineffective.160 Ethical obligations of prosecutors
are outlined in the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rule for
Professional Conduct 3.8,161 also adopted in Washington state.162
Washington State Rule for Professional Conduct 3.8(d) provides guidance
specific to prosecutors about disclosure of favorable evidence:
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt
of the accused or mitigates the offense and, in connection with
sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all
mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the
prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of
the tribunal . . .163
Rule 3.8 is the only rule that guides ethical duties specific to
prosecutors,164 and the rule is unique in that the majority of model rules do
not distinguish between private and public attorneys.165 The rule provides
more strict parameters than Brady initially obligated.166 It requires known
favorable evidence to be disclosed in a timely manner, regardless of a
defendant’s request.167 This is a positive step that should help deter Brady
violations.
Yet a rule is only effective when enforced.168 Yale scholars identified
multiple breakdowns in professional responsibility measures .169 The
160
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findings included a failure for ethical rules to define prosecutorial
misconduct (arguing a weakness of Rule 3.8 highlighted above), a lack of
appropriate

rights

for

complainants,

an

overbroad

discretion

of

administrators making decisions, reporting failures among those who have
knowledge of misconduct, and confusion about disciplinary authorities,
based on overlapping policy avenues.170 A troubling illustration of
unsanctioned complaints is present in the Washington state data. For
example, the most recent ABA Survey on Lawyer Discipline System results
from 2017171 demonstrates that less than 5% of complaints filed with the
ABA in Washington state resulted in sanctions for attorneys.172 This figure
includes all complaints of misconduct, not just those regarding alleged
Brady violations.173 In Washington state the decision-making boards are
mostly populated by attorneys.174 In 2017, only 29% of the board members
were non-attorneys,175 leaving little outside attention and guidance towards
this accountability mechanism. As discussed above, attorneys are not likely
to report the unethical or illegal behavior of their own colleagues, and
therefore, the majority-attorney composition of these state boards is
problematic.
There is no federally mandated accountability mechanism in place that
systematically and specifically addresses Brady violations and other forms
of prosecutorial misconduct.176 Individual states are also lacking.177 The
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state of New York recently passed legislation to institute a commission on
prosecutorial conduct, the first state to do so.178 This legislation is currently
ensnared in legal challenges from district attorneys in that state, discussed
in Section V below.179
As demonstrated above, each possible avenue to provide accountability
for Brady violations proves problematic. Appellate, civil, criminal,
professional conduct, federal, and state mechanisms each lack strong hooks
for prosecutors, or provide such hooks with nearly no realistic enforcement.
This leaves prosecutors free to engage in behaviors they undertake under
the guise of “passionately” enforcing justice,180 while innocent, wrongfully
convicted members of society continue to suffer injustices.

V. CREATING THE WASHINGTON STATE COMMISSION ON
PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT
To decrease Brady violations and their resulting wrongful convictions,
Washington state should draft and pass legislation to create a Commission
on Prosecutorial Conduct. The Commission can help deter prosecutorial
misconduct, including Brady violations, in three ways: (1) the Commission
should process, track, evaluate, and offer findings on complaints of
prosecutorial misconduct, including Brady violations; (2) the Commission
should build a professional development program, which can work with
each county prosecuting attorney’s office to offer training specific to
prosecutorial conduct and Brady violations; and (3) the Commission should
partner with the three law schools in Washington state to offer curricular
content and co-curricular training on the topic of prosecutorial ethics and
Brady violations. Through accountability, training, and teaching, the
Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct will reduce Brady violations and

177
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provide a mechanism for correcting the harm felt in the wake of their
occurrence.181
A. Building the Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct
In order for the Washington State Legislature to create realistic
legislation that can be passed, members of the Legislature should scan the
environment and research benefits and challenges of current models.
Legislators can address federal immunity guidelines182 and learn from New
York’s passed legislation and its forthcoming Commission.183 They can also
learn from Washington state’s own Commission on Judicial Conduct,184 as
well as King County’s Brady Committee.185 Once legislators have drafted
measures that will ensure accountability for Brady violations and other
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forms of prosecutorial misconduct, they should also make recommendations
for how the Commission can collaborate with municipalities and law
schools to train and teach students and new attorneys on ethics topics.
1. Addressing Federal Immunity Within the Model
To start the process of building a Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct,
state legislators should consider the problematic federal parameters
regarding civil rights violations.186 As discussed in Section II, the current §
1983 statute, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, was passed in
an effort to protect public officials, who were working to ensure the rights
of former slaves, from being swept up into frivolous lawsuits by antiReconstructionist government officials.187 In drafting the bill to enact the
Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct, legislators should work within legal
parameters to justly interpret the United States Supreme Court’s rulings on
absolute immunity. Even though it is a federal statute, a critique of § 1983’s
unsupported historical common law underpinnings188 should guide
Washington state’s own Commission guidelines. Although Washington
state is limited by Imbler,189 the Washington State Supreme Court may
choose how to interpret the rules related to absolute immunity set forth in
the case. The United States Supreme Court in Imbler clearly indicated that
when a prosecutor is initiating and presenting the State’s case, the
prosecutor acts under the shield of absolute immunity.190 Yet, the Court
reserved on what type of immunity should be extended when the prosecutor
is acting as an administrator or investigator.191 Many attorneys and scholars

186

See supra Section II.
Johns, supra note 19, at 510.
188
See supra Section II.
189
Kate McClelland, “Somebody Help Me Understand This”: The Supreme Court’s
Interpretation of Prosecutorial Immunity and Liability under § 1983, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1323, 1331 (2012).
190
Id.
191
Id.
187

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

When the Home Team Calls Their Own Balls and Strikes

criticize the functional test provided in Imbler.192 Washington state may
choose to interpret the rules that guide § 1983 claims in a manner that
allows for accountability when, during the course of preparing for and
presenting a case, a prosecutor engages in a Brady violation.193 It is
shocking to uncover that the roots of what is now applied as absolute
immunity for prosecutors actually rests in the bedrock of Reconstruction
efforts to hold prosecutors civilly liable for malicious prosecution.194 The
current application completely contradicts the original intent.195 It will be a
strong “bend in the arc” towards moral justice if jurisdictions and legal
professionals radically reinterpret § 1983 and use its guidance in a manner
more closely aligned with its intention at the time of the 1871 Congress.196
2. New York as a Model
To date, only New York state has passed legislation regarding a
Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct.197 New York Senate Bill S2412D
was passed by the New York State Legislature and signed by Governor
Andrew Cuomo on August 20, 2018.198 According to the bill, the New York
Commission, when appointed,199 will consist of eleven members appointed
from the three branches of government (i.e., governor, President of Senate,
chief judge of court of appeals, among others).200 The Commission will
have functions of conducting hearings and investigations, oaths,
affirmations, subpoenas, and other related activities needed to make
decisions and offer findings.201 The Commission will be able to confer
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immunity202 and will be able to implement recommended penalties.203
Washington state’s Commission should maintain many of the same
elements as the New York legislation204 and build off this model’s
strengths.
3. Washington State’s Commission on Judicial Conduct
Another model that legislators can use as an example is Washington
state’s own Commission on Judicial Conduct. The Commission on Judicial
Conduct was created by a 1980 voter passed amendment to the state
constitution.205 Goals of the Commission on Judicial Conduct include the
following:
… [to] maintain confidence and integrity in the judicial system;
provide the public with a fair and reasonable process to address
judicial misconduct or disability; preserve judicial independence;
provide public accountability; protect the rights of the public while
safeguarding the reputations of judges from unfounded
accusations.206
The listed goals highlight a balance between a desire for public
accountability and a protection for judicial reputation.207 Legislators should
use these goals to inform their work. They should also look to the
Commission on Judicial Conduct for models of how to manage complaints,
investigations, and findings.208
For example, the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct
uses an open records process but maintains confidentiality until the
202
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Commission finds probable cause or reasonable grounds on a complaint.209
After probable cause on a violation is found, a statement of charges is filed
as a public record.210 From there, fact-finding hearings and records that
form the basis of the findings are filed within the hearing record.211 Any
member of the public may search the Commission’s website to research
findings of any Washington state judge.212 In a process that likely assuages
judges’ concerns regarding their own reputations, the Commission must
first have probable cause of a violation before records are made public.213
Similarly, before making a public record, the Commission on Prosecutorial
Conduct should conduct a thorough investigation,214 and only make
complaints public once probable cause has been established. This approach
will promote transparency in the process, which will both enhance the
accountability mechanism and promote public trust in the process.
The Commission on Judicial Conduct may also serve as a model in
regard to appointees, which is a top constitutional concern in the
forthcoming New York Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct.215 In
Washington state, the Commission on Judicial Conduct is housed within the
judicial branch,216 yet the Commission takes appointments from both the
judicial branch and the governor—whose position is in the executive
branch.217 It appears that the Commission on Judicial Conduct includes
cross branch appointments that were not determined to violate the
Washington State Constitution.218 Further, it makes sense for the
Washington State Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct to be housed
209
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under the judicial branch. This way, the commission could make findings
and recommendations and deliver them to the Washington State Supreme
Court. Like the powers enumerated in regard to licensure and disbarment,219
the Court is best suited to deliver any findings of the Commission. Looking
for guidance from the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct
illustrates that, even if New York state stands as the only current legislated
model related to prosecutorial conduct,220 other models of accountability
can inform the legislation drafting process.
4. King County’s Brady Committee
An additional model exists within county systems that are working to
curb Brady violations. For example, Washington state’s King County
formed a Brady Committee in 2007.221 The committee and its resultant
Brady protocol was “the first of its kind in the state and was adopted, with
some changes, by the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys
(WAPA) soon after.”222 The protocol seeks to ensure the King County
Prosecuting Attorney’s Office meets its Brady obligations during the
administration of investigations and criminal proceedings.223 The protocol
covers reports of officer dishonesty, false witness statements, and crime lab
dishonesty.224 Further, the protocol provides methods for disclosure of
Brady material that has been collected by the Brady Committee.225 Since
the inception of the Committee, the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s
office has modified the protocol as needed and is, as of 2020, working on
another revision.226 King County’s Brady Committee may not provide an
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accountability mechanism in regard to discipline, but it does help track
known offenders.227
As discussed in Section II, the naming of Brady offenders is a topic rife
with controversy, with judges often going out of their way to exclude the
names of prosecutorial bad actors within appeals.228 King County’s Brady
Committee does not speak directly to naming prosecutors because its goal is
to assist prosecutors in proactively meeting their Brady obligations.229
Nevertheless, it creates a structure that should make future accountability
mechanisms easier to establish. Further, King County’s Brady Committee,
in collaboration with the proposed Washington State Commission on
Prosecutorial Conduct, will be able to guide training and teaching
components, helping to shift the culture regarding disclosure of
information. This collaboration will positively benefit both prosecutors and
individuals facing criminal convictions.
B. Professional Development and Teaching
The ultimate goal of the Washington State Commission on Prosecutorial
Conduct will be to provide an accountability mechanism for prosecutorial
misconduct. The Commission’s function in this regard will be reactive and
responsive to complaints received. In addition, the Commission has a
unique opportunity to provide proactive support for new attorneys within
county and municipal settings. Law students would benefit from being
trained and taught prosecutorial ethics and the complexities involved in
Brady obligations and violations. This proactive approach will assist in
preventing new prosecutors from committing violations. Early training is
woefully missing from teaching and new professional environments.230
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The current landscape of ethics education in law schools is critiqued as
being underdeveloped.231 A study published in the early 1990s stated that
less than 2% of the pages of law school casebooks consisted of ethics based
content or discussion.232 Further, some critics offer that the teaching of
ethics has been cordoned off to one Professional Responsibility course.233
Professional Responsibility is often taught in such a formal manner that true
ethical quandaries are not introduced for discussion.234
Law schools should spend more time in the classroom discussing ethics
within the legal profession and specifically address Brady violations. These
discussions can be delivered through the curriculum, in courses covering
Evidence, Professional Responsibility, and Trial Advocacy, to name a few.
Outside the classroom, students interested in becoming prosecutors should
host trainings on how to meet Brady obligations and avoid engaging in
Brady violations. Students interested in criminal defense should host
trainings on how to be aware of pitfalls within Brady obligations; how to
recognize signs of possible Brady violations; and how to seek exculpatory
evidence from the prosecution (requests, motions, investigation, and
interpersonal communications with the other side). Education both in and
out of the classroom will better prepare new attorneys to grapple with issues
presented when Brady obligations are at stake.235
Offices of prosecution should develop trainings and Continuing Legal
Education opportunities that will assist prosecutors in their understanding of
how to meet obligations, avoid violations, and engage in discussions about
the ethics of reporting. These trainings can create culture shifts and allow
for prosecutors to align ethics with practice. The Misconduct Report from

provided to new attorneys, which creates an environment ripe for Brady issues and other
types of prosecutorial misconduct.
231
Granfield & Koenig, supra note 168, at 499.
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the National Registry of Exonerations perfectly summarizes how a
prosecutor can wield their power to prevent Brady violations:
A prosecutor has the power to attack official misconduct in
criminal cases by several means. She can order her deputies not to
. . . [conceal] exculpatory evidence . . . or direct them to follow
protocols that make that misconduct impossible, such as open file
discovery. She can discipline or discharge deputies who violate
those orders . . . She can dismiss charges in cases that are tainted
by misconduct by her own deputies or by other law enforcement
officials . . . She can prosecute . . . any official who commits or
procures perjury, or obstructs justice. She can reinvestigate past
cases to see if misconduct was committed or miscarriages of
justice occurred, and exonerate any innocent defendants she
identifies.236
The prosecutor can do these things if the prosecutor is empowered to do so.
Creating a direct line between the proposed Commission on Prosecutorial
Conduct and professional development opportunities will incentivize new
prosecutors to meet their own Brady obligations. Prosecutors who
coordinate with the Commission for teaching and training opportunities will
come to understand the role the Commission can play in their work—who
they can turn to if they need to make a report and who they may face if they
become the subject of a complaint.
Teaching and training costs at the law school level will be fairly low if
they are integrated into already existing classes and supported by way of
student clubs and organizations. Costs in early professional development
should be appropriated from the (eventual) cost savings based on
prosecuting the right person, the first time. For reasons of legal ethics, it can
be assumed that Commission appointees will fill non-salaried positions, so
if the training and teaching components are included as part of their duties,
costs will remain quite low for law school and county prosecutor offices. If
further funds are needed to support these programs, perhaps the Innocence
236
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Projects and the National Registry of Exonerations can develop grant
opportunities. After all, the work of organizations like these becomes easier
if there are fewer Brady violations, and therefore fewer wrongful
convictions, within the criminal justice system.

VI. CRITIQUES AND RESPONSES
Currently, there is no definitive roadmap to developing and
implementing accountability mechanisms for prosecutorial misconduct. As
discussed in Section IV, most possible mechanisms are underutilized or
unenforced.237 In looking at models for guidance, the best example lies
within New York state’s Senate Bill S2412D legislation.238 There are many
aspects to the New York model that can inform Washington state’s work to
develop a Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct. Perhaps even more
important than a legislative review is the need to understand criticisms of
the New York legislation. Immediately upon the passage of Senate Bill
S2412D, it was met with legal challenges from groups of prosecutors who
claimed their immunity was challenged.239 According to a lead
representative for the District Attorneys Association of New York
(DAASNY), the organization offered to engage in legislation drafting with
state legislators but the request was not entertained by them.240 Instead, an
amended version of the bill was revealed—allegedly without providing for
corrections to the constitutional issues that DAASNY had noted throughout
the drafting of the legislation.241 Seven distinct arguments are included in
the complaint,242 many of which should inform how Washington state drafts
its own legislation for a Commission.
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The complaint filed on behalf of DAASNY challenges the legislature’s
interference with the core functions of the District Attorney’s Office, which
is established by the New York State Constitution.243 The complaint also
alleges a violation of the separation of powers doctrine within the New
York State Constitution.244 The complaint alleges that the appointment of
commission members from multiple branches of state government would
result in cross branch discipline for prosecuting attorneys, who are
considered part of the executive branch.245 The Association has argued that
prosecutors will be less likely to pursue difficult cases while acting with the
knowledge that they can be scrutinized by a commission that receives
appointments from all branches of government.246 The complaint also raises
Due Process and Equal Protection violations,247 and alleges that the bill did
not name standards by which the Commission will make decisions on the

Article 15-A is riddled with fatal constitutional defects, as the Governor and
State Attorney General’s Office have both concluded. Specifically, the statute:
(1) impermissibly interferes with the constitutionally protected independence
and core functions of elected District Attorneys by granting the CPC general
oversight and disciplinary authority over the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion; (2) violates basic separation-of-powers principles by vesting
oversight of an executive function in a hybrid disciplinary body, most of
whose members are appointed by the Legislature, and by authorizing the Court
of Appeals to suspend District Attorneys; (3) impermissibly expands the
powers and jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and the Chief Judge; (4)
unlawfully compels judges to perform non-judicial tasks; (5) impermissibly
intrudes upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Appellate Division over matters
of attorney discipline; (6) unlawfully subjects prosecutors to discipline without
any governing standards, in contravention of their due process and equal
protection rights; and (7) impermissibly creates a commission with
administrative and executive duties that operates outside the clear confines of
the Constitution’s civil department system.
Complaint at 2, Soares v. State of New York, (No. 906409-18), 2018 WL 6169368 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 17, 2018).
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initiation of investigations, the sustaining of complaints, and the
determination of disciplinary sanctions.248
Within the complaints described above, the constitutional issues raised
by DAASNY allege an imbalance of power that will leave prosecutors
vulnerable and disempower them from doing their jobs.249 However, in the
current legislation, nearly every appointed panel member will come from
the legal community, with more than half of the appointees creating a
balance of seasoned prosecutors and defense attorneys.250 Further
amendments, which would have placed more appointment power with the
governor, and hence within the executive branch, did not move forward.251
Since the filing of these complaints, several opposing parties have also
filed briefs, in part to counter arguments made within the initial
complaint.252 Among them are groups who feel a Commission is needed to
hold prosecutors who engage in misconduct accountable for their actions.253
The Innocence Project, a national organization that works to exonerate
wrongfully convicted individuals, filed briefs on behalf of several men in
New York who have been wrongfully convicted.254 The Innocence Project
argues that a lack of oversight for prosecutorial conduct has very
consequential outcomes for innocent individuals.255 Governor Cuomo of
New York knowingly signed into law legislation that he admitted was rife
with legal challenges, naming the importance of moving forward this
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initiative.256 He agreed not to activate the Commission until these legal
challenges are resolved.257
In January 2020, a New York Supreme Court justice ruled the
Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct unconstitutional.258 This was
considered a win for DAASNY and places the proposed Commission at risk
of failure. That said, illuminating why the legislation faces legal challenges,
and what arguments are presented on both sides of the legal challenges,
allows for Washington state to build stronger legislation with fewer
opportunities for constitutional legal challenges. Washington state should
learn from the criticism of how the New York bill was drafted and work to
call upon prosecutors’ organizations and prosecutors’ offices in various
municipalities across the state to help draft the bill that will enact the
Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct. If a collaborative approach is taken
to ensure the Commission does not impede on prosecutors’ duties and their
own constitutional rights, it may prevent immediate legal challenges as the
process moves forward. Learning from New York’s challenges is one way
to clear a path for Washington state.

VII. CONCLUSION
The culture of non-disclosure and Brady violations in criminal
proceedings create a myriad of negative impacts for society including
wrongful convictions and taxpayer burden. Presently, there are no highly
successful, or even slightly successful, avenues for accountability. A
common law misnomer that is unsupported by history has resulted in
immunity for prosecutors, essentially barring individuals from civil remedy.
At the state and federal level, prosecutors are rarely prosecuted criminally
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for committing a Brady violation.259 Professional standards seemingly have
no teeth, and there have been no federal or state mandates across the board
to provide accountability mechanisms. New York state has started to forge
a model, passing a bill to enact a Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct.
The New York bill may or may not survive the current legal challenges and
the recent New York Supreme Court holding celebrated by prosecutors,
who feel, generally, that their own constitutional rights are being trampled
upon. As a model, New York offers helpful guidance, and also several large
hurdles to overcome.
Washington state can use the New York model to legislate and
implement its own Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct. The Commission
can process, track, evaluate, and offer findings on complaints of
prosecutorial misconduct, as well as make recommendations to the
Washington State Supreme Court in regard to sanctions. Further, the
Commission can collaborate with county prosecutors’ offices and with law
schools, institutions with demonstrated gaps in ethics teaching and
trainings.
Washington state can influence prosecutorial conduct by way of these
three distinct touch points. We can work to reduce the systematic and
heartbreaking ramifications that result from Brady violations. We can teach
ethics. We can teach procedure to meet obligation. We can hold individuals
accountable when they act in ways that inappropriately strip other
individuals of their freedom. As we do, we will move away from the current
practice of shielding prosecutors from accountability. We will stop allowing
the home team to call their own balls and strikes.
A reduction in the occurrence of Brady violations will result in fewer
wrongful convictions, less trauma for victims and their families, and less
waste of taxpayer money. In the end, we need to teach attorneys how to do
the right thing and hold them accountable when they do not meet their
259
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obligations. When we do, society will benefit. At its core, is that not what
we hope systems of justice will achieve in the first place? When these
systems meet that achievement, justice is done its citizens in the courts, and
the United States truly wins its point.260
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